The Prospect of Political Bankruptcy in Mozambique's 2024 Post-Elections

Mozambique held its 7th presidential elections in October 2024 in a context of increased poverty, rising costs of living, deteriorating quality of education and healthcare, and, more generally, widespread dissatisfaction among citizens withthe ruling party, Frelimo, which has been in power since 1975. This time around, the election had at least four main contestants: Frelimo, Renamo, MDM,and a new entrant in the race for the presidency, Venâncio Mondlane (hereafterVM), supported by the Podemos party. VM was one of the most popular and some what charismatic candidates, a fact that may have been underestimated by his opponents. Unsurprisingly, the elections were fraught with irregularities, as noted by both national and international observers. Nonetheless, the national electoral commission declared a landslide victory for Frelimo, assigning 70% of the votes to their candidate Daniel Chapo, approximately 20%to VM, and the remainder to the other two parties and candidates. The results were met with strong opposition, with VM and his party asserting they had won and vowing to challenge the outcome in the constitutional council. During this period, VM's lawyer was brutally assassinated in the streets of Maputo, shot 25times. In response, VM announced peaceful mass protests against the killing of his lawyer and advocated for what he called verdade eleitoral (electoral truth). The responsibility to validate or reject  the election results fell to the constitutional council, which took over two months to issue a ruling, a period marked by widespread protests across the country.

The protests began peacefully but escalated when police started firing at protesters with both rubber bullets and live ammunition. This sparked animosity among the population, and the protests intensified over the following weeks.The regime's response was brutal: fearing for his life, VM fled the country but continued to communicate with his supporters through Facebook, where he announced the various stages of the protests.  Soon, major cities resembled war zones. The military was deployed under the pretence of restoring order, but the streets were ablaze with burning tires, and incidents of violence and looting surged.Gunfire echoed throughout urban areas, and as security forces continued targeting protesters, public anger turned against symbols of power. Police stations, Frelimo party offices, toll gates, and economic infrastructure tied to political elites became targets. Over 300 lives have been lost since the protests erupted. Economically, the unrest further strained an already struggling government. Businesses faltered, mobility was restricted, and the sluggish economy began showing signs of a deeper crisis. To compound matters, the constitutional council, citing that election irregularities had no significant impact on the results, validated the outcome, confirming Daniel Chapo as the winner. This decision, widely seen as influenced by Frelimo’s dominance over state institutions, only inflamed public outrage and deepened the country’s political, social, and economic instability.

Prior to the swearing-in of the newly "elected" president Chapo, VM returned to Mozambique and declared himself the country's president. Simultaneously, Chapo was inaugurated on January 15, but the populace largely refused to recognize him as their legitimate leader. To date, Mozambique effectively has two presidents: Chapo, who is recognized by the country’s institutions but struggles to exert control, and VM, who is regarded by the people as their true president. VM continues to issue orders via social media, where his directives are enforced by popular support, while Chapo relies on the security forces to maintain order. To date, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that Chapo inherited a politically bankrupt government from his predecessor, even if, in theory, he will form his own administration. The government’s current state of political bankruptcy has been years in the making. Over the past decade, mismanagement has pushed the country to the brink. The signs of political bankruptcy are clear: citizens have shrugged their shoulders and turned their backs on the government. Politicians remain in office, but they are devoid of authority, and even coercion is unlikely to succeed – indifference to authority is now widespread.

Under the current regime, the government may continue to function, but not as before.It cannot rely on an indifferent population to comply with its laws. The regime which now lacks popular consent has been coercing people to do what it wants. However, it should not come as a surprise, as electoral autocracies like Mozambique often resort to violence to maintain power.

The future remains uncertain, but if the trend persists, another wave of mass protests seems inevitable, especially as a bankrupt government often struggles to sustain education, healthcare, pensions, and other essential services that citizens rightfully expect from those in power. Chapo, in his inaugural speech, promised to implement reforms, but whatever the political discourse may be, the glimmer of hope for a politically stable and economically prosperous Mozambique grows dimmer.

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Celso Monjane (Lecturer in the Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand)